The semantics betray deep strains in the Washington-Seoul alliance. This week, when South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun calls on George W. Bush for a get-to-know-you summit in the White House, talk will focus on the North Korean nuclear crisis. But the backdrop–indeed, the issue that overshadows all others in the 50-year-old partnership–is America’s ongoing review of its role in the defense of South Korea. Officially, the Pentagon says its troops will stay as long as they’re wanted and needed. But in the wake of 9-11, the huge anti-American protests that erupted across the South last year and America’s recent blitzkrieg into Iraq, the Bush administration is questioning the utility of a force “whose mission it is to die or be wounded,” says William Drennan, deputy director of the United States Institute of Peace in Washington. “People are asking: ‘Do we really want to expose ourselves any longer?’ "
Seoul may already know the answer. Just days after his election triumph last December, Roh tasked South Korea’s top brass with making contingency plans for an eventual U.S. scale-down on the peninsula. They include a new command structure, a force reconfiguration and a procurement spree unprecedented since the cold war. While it’s true that he has acted to slow any American departure, both by toning down anti-U.S. street protests and by arguing that it’s unwise to pull GIs off the DMZ before the nuclear crisis abates, Roh’s actions betray a belief that, sooner or later, Seoul will take a leading role in its own defense.
Washington isn’t about to pull up its stakes and leave the Korean Peninsula entirely, to be sure. But serious discussions about downsizing the U.S. combat force in the South have been underway for months. In March the two sides began high-level negotiations on the alliance’s future, and both promptly agreed to begin relocating the Eighth Army’s Yongsan headquarters, a town-size complex located in the heart of Seoul, farther south later this year. Also in March, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said South Korea “has all the capability in the world of providing the kind of upfront deterrent that’s needed” along the DMZ, adding that whether the 2ID would come home, move farther south or relocate to a neighboring country “are the kinds of things that are being sorted out.”
Military analysts believe that, should the U.S. stage a first strike to take out North Korean nuclear facilities (as the Clinton administration nearly did when nuclear talks broke down in 1994), Pyongyang might retaliate by targeting U.S. –units within range of its guns. The purpose: to exact revenge on America without starting a full-scale war. Shifting frontline duties to the South Korean military would eliminate the danger without compromising security. With twice North Korea’s population and 30 times its GDP, the South has the capability to take on the mission, most experts concur. Yet many Koreans suspect that a U.S. pullback would free the Bush administration’s hand to launch a pre-emptive war against North Korea without first consulting Seoul.
That’s partly why many in the South worry about a U.S. troop withdrawal. Conditioned to believe that the size and status of U.S. forces would remain unchanged until unification–if not longer–older-generation Koreans, who recall the sacrifice of U.S. troops during the Korean War, think the Americans are pivotal to keeping peace on the peninsula. “Without U.S. troops on the front line, possibilities of another war are very high,” says Oh Hyung Man, a 58-year-old businessman. “Those youngsters who called for the withdrawal of U.S. soldiers would not be able to defend our country.”
Seoul is bolstering its capabilities ahead of an expected U.S. pullback. Just last week the Defense Ministry unveiled a long-term plan for the largest defense buildup in a decade. It includes the procurement of a spy satellite, AWACS radar, a submarine, aerial-refueling technology and long-range missiles–all to counter the North Korean threat. The cost: up to $26 billion, a bill the government plans to foot by raising defense spending from the current 2.7 percent of GDP to 3.5 percent by 2020.
And there is nothing casual about this buying spree. The items on the South’s shopping list suggest a shift away from ground forces toward enhanced air and naval power–two capabilities for which it currently relies on the United States. Next year Seoul will take delivery on the first of 40 F-15K fighter jets from Boeing, and it may soon buy Aegis anti-missile destroyers and American Patriot missile batteries. Should the 2ID leave, “a lack of intelligence-gathering capabilities will be our biggest problem,” says Han Yong Sup of Korea National Defense University. “The purchase of AWACS and other high-tech systems will be expedited. This is not unrelated to the recent moves of U.S. troops.”
Nor is the shift in semantics. One recent clue was the sudden appearance of the phrase “defense independence” in official pronouncements. “Independence has become the buzzword,” says Professor Han. “It automatically assumes changes in the status of U.S. forces in South Korea.” And those aren’t empty words.
